

INTRODUCTION

General Westmoreland, while Commander, US Army Vietnam (USARV), and later as Army Chief of Staff, promoted a large and active wartime IG system "to be alert and smell out and solve problems while they are small." Experience had taught him that soldiers needed assistance and commanders needed the ability to investigate and inspect even in war. Unfortunately, his opinion was that few soldiers and even fewer senior commanders understood this fact and the value of the IG system to the Army in wartime.

General Westmoreland's perception has been held by other Army leaders, and the IG system itself is partly to blame. Historically, we have not done a good job of delineating, expressing and articulating what is the IG's role in deployments and combat. As a result, some commanders only see an IG as someone who is available for more "important" duty once the shooting begins.

The purpose of the IG Wartime Role block of instruction is to provide students facts

and concepts so as to be able to prepare their office for its role in deployments and combat, and to demonstrate to their commander that

- o Inspector general functions do not change as the environment transitions from peacetime operations to war and sustained combat.

- o Assistance/investigation case types and trends and inspection focus do change (e.g., from unit/BASEOPS, high payback issues to war stopper issues).

- o The IG is an essential part of the wartime staff at all levels.

The term "wartime" when used in this instruction means the full range of Army scenarios and contingencies from peacetime engagements (e.g., military assistance) to limited and global nuclear war.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

THE FIRST WARTIME INSPECTORS GENERAL

The US Army IG system was born in wartime. The Continental-Congress authorized the appointment of inspectors general in the midst of the Revolutionary War (1775 - 1781) primarily to improve the training and warfighting efficiency of the American Army: "reformation of the various abuses which prevail in the different departments ...to review, from time to time, the troops...to see that every officer and soldier be instructed in the exercise and manoeuvres...that rules of discipline be strictly observed and that officers command their soldiers properly and do them justice." Major Revolutionary War IG issues were:

- * Training and readiness (no standard drill regulations).
- * Administration (accountability of personnel).
- * Class I (no meat rations).
- * Maintenance (sick horses).
- * Pay.
- * Weapons security (loss of firearms).

NINETEENTH CENTURY WARTIME INSPECTORS GENERAL

The position of Inspector General lost its prominence after the Revolutionary War but came back to life, at least in name, with the War of 1812 (1812 - 1814). Reauthorized by Congress and with duties specified by the War Department, the IG during this war was to note discipline, facilities and equipment and was to conduct musters and examine financial accounts. But the War Department also permitted the IG to command and the Army's senior IG, BG Alexander Smyth, did just that during a campaign along the

Niagara River. BG Smyth lead so poorly that his troops by the end of the campaign, in frustration and discontent, began shooting at his tent. The Army released Smyth and Congress abolished the position of IG.

The Regular Army expanded from 8,500 to 30,000+ when the United States went to war with Mexico (1846 - 1848). This expansion included two, authorized inspectors general. These IGs were deployed to the field with the troops, not because Army senior leadership recognized the value of IGs as inspectors, but because they had no concept of anything better for IGs to do. Instead, IGs were used as commanders, mustering agents, assistants to other generals and to process Mexican prisoners of war.

The United States Army was authorized two IGs and five assistant IGs at the beginning of the Civil War (1861 - 1865). There was neither a formal IG department at War Department level to give centralized guidance to these IGs nor was there an established, clearly defined duty description. But as the war advanced, wartime requirements forced the evolution of an IG organization and a clearer definition of its purpose.

An IG was assigned to the War Department staff in January 1863. This was a marked accomplishment because though it was not the birth of the Office of the Inspector General, it was the starting point whereby the IG became a permanent War Department fixture.

It was also during the Civil War that the IG was first used on a regular basis by the Secretary of War to conduct inquiries and investigations. In January 1863, for instance, the Secretary of War ordered an inspector general to investigate a mutinous unit of the Army of the Cumberland, the Anderson Cavalry. The inspector general conducting the investigation found merit in men's

complaints that they had been misled about their assignments, but recommended that examples be made of the more rebellious ringleaders.

Major Civil War IG issues were:

- * Audits (e.g., quartermaster accounts).
- * Care/utilization of horses.
- * Ordnance production.
- * Personnel (MOS violations, pension applications).
- * PX (Butler operations).
- * Training (military college programs)

Transportation calamities, epidemics in the southern camps, inedible or undelivered rations, and unit unpreparedness for deployments overseas were among the major problems soldiers faced in the Spanish American War (1898). All of these command and management inefficiencies should have been detected by the IG system and corrected; but they were not.

The Office of the Inspector General at the War Department did little inspecting during the Spanish American War and few unit IGs were able to transition out of their peacetime mode. The situation was only made worse when TIC said he felt it more honorable to be near danger with no particular job than to be safe at home on the staff. Thus, senior inspectors went to the field, not to inspect or assist, but to follow TIG's emotional guidance to advance toward the sound of the guns for one last time. The IG received considerable journalistic and Congressional criticism for failing to report trouble when it developed during this war.

WORLD WAR I (1917-1918)

The U.S. Army entered World War I with 40 authorized IGs. This number peaked at

215 officers assigned. Inspector general wartime activities were more centralized and inspection oriented than in any previous war.

CONUS...All combat divisions were inspected at least twice by the Office of the Inspector General prior to their overseas deployment. Teams of inspectors were stationed at ports of embarkation with the authority to delay movement if they felt that personnel or equipment were not ready.

OC0NU8...The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) IG was among the original group of staff officers to accompany the AEF commander to France and they remained on the CG's personal staff throughout the war.

Inspectors general did not conduct periodic, routine, organization inspections for the units in France. Inspections were general in nature and for the purpose of determining whether units were ready for service at the front. In addition, the AEF Commander required that at least one division in each corps be visited daily by an AEF IG.

As war casualties mounted and replacements arrived to fill the losses, IGs were often used as teachers and advisors to the inexperienced unit commanders. When the war ended, IGs evaluated the condition of units preparing for redeployment to CONUS and monitored the disposition of surplus property and the settlement of civilian claims. Major WWI IG issues were:

- * Administration.
- * Animal and motor transport.
- * Combat efficiency.
- * Equipment maintenance.
- * Fiscal/property accountability.
- * Leadership.

- * Morale.
- * Officer efficiency.
- * POM.
- * Purchasing oversight.
- * Readiness for deployment.
- * Training (e.g., care of animals, property accountability, debt collection).

WORLD WAR II (1941 - 1945)

There were ten officers on duty in the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and 30 in the field in 1939, just two years prior to the United States entry into World War II. This number rose to 219 officers in December 1941, 937 in November 1943, and over 3,000 by 1945. The Office of the Inspector General was one of the few departments to remain on the War staff after the Reorganization of 1942. It was a credit to senior Army leadership to realize that placing the IG anywhere else would handicap IG effectiveness.

CONUS...The 1942 OIG consisted of a Procurement, Construction, Field Service, Reviews, Inspection, Investigations and Miscellaneous Divisions. The OIG later consolidated its functions into only two divisions: an Investigation Division and an Inspections Services. A third division, the Special Section, was established in June 1941 to monitor race relations.

As in World War I, IGs inspected units deploying overseas and were given the authority to determine whether a unit could depart. As the war progressed, investigation issues evolved from matters of sabotage, disloyalty and defeatism to issues concerning the morale and welfare of enlisted personnel and finally to contract fraud, bribery, deficiencies in administration, treatment of POWs and medical care.

Division-level IGs in CONUS spent most of their time concentrating on preparation

for overseas movement (POM). The depth of their responsibilities varied in accordance with the wishes of their particular commander and the situation of their unit. The XII Corps IG, for example, was required to review the personnel and health records of every member of the command to ensure shots had been given, allotments made and so forth. The 71st Division IG monitored insurance and War Bond briefings and administration. Tactical unit IGs were especially concerned with training and the packing, crating and marking of organizational equipment. There are recorded cases where, at the port of embarkation, IGs gave, or arranged, classes on new equipment which had been issued to the unit at the last minute.

OCONUS...The Overseas Inspections Division, OIG, was organized in December 1942, to respond to problems affecting personnel and HQDA programs outside CONUS. The division monitored individual personnel problem trends, such as consistently late pay in a given area, and tried to determine the causes and solutions. The division did numerous surveys, inquiries, and investigations into topics ranging from general officer misconduct to replacement flow into the Pacific Theater. A final series of surveys was made by the division late in the war to assist in demobilization planning and redeployment of overseas personnel. The final burst of wartime activity was spent investigating the statements of returned U.S. POWs as to their treatment and the circumstances of their surrender.

Army level inspectors general averaged three to four command directed investigations a month. Topics ranged from escaped prisoners and violations of the Geneva Convention to racial problems and the maintenance of motor vehicles. Several IGs were tasked by their commanders to continue annual general inspections. For example, the Sixth Army IG in the Pacific inspected, on the average, four units a month even during the Philippine campaign. Major unit IGs were also given the task of coordinating

inspections and staff visits from their level so that subordinate units would not be overwhelmed by visitors.

The trend was for IG sections to grow once units entered the combat zone. Unit IGs did many of the same duties they had stateside but were modified by the particular command desires or unique situations and requirements. A major IG concern was the timely distribution of publications and directives unique to the theater of operations and unit compliance with the new requirements.

The inspector general workload almost doubled with force demobilization issues after VJ-Day. Major World War II IG issues were:

- * Absentee voting.
- * Audits.
- * Black market; illegal currency transactions.
- * Casualty treatment.
- * Contracting.
- * Disloyalty.
- * Health records.
- * Inspection and evaluation of federalized NG units.
- * Looting/pilfering.
- * Maintenance.
- * Medical readiness/training.
- * Morale/welfare.
- * POM.
- * PoWs.
- * PX.
- * Race relations.

* Readiness for deployment.

KOREAN WAR (1950 - '953)

The first wartime mission given the OIG upon the outbreak of the Korean War was to judge the adequacy of the Far East Theater's administrative support to the troops in combat. Weaknesses were observed in the areas of postal operations, graves registration, and the stockage of cold weather clothing. The IG also surveyed the handling of casualties in CONUS after they returned from Korea.

The biggest IG workload of the war was in responding to assistance requests and complaints. Nearly 380 IGARs were handled in the first 18 months of the war by DAIG alone. Cases included lost money orders and allotments, late mail, improper casualty handling, property stolen from wounded, poor training prior to deployment, and the abuse of command authority.

Several investigations into combat operations by inspectors general had significant impact on Army procedures. An IG investigation into allegations from a father that the Army withheld, delayed, and improperly acted upon casualty reports concerning his son, initiated the following major changes in U.S. Army policies and procedures:

1. Mandatory inclusion of Casualty Reporting procedures at all service schools.
2. A DA Memo directing that all notifications from DA to next of kin be sent exclusively over the signature of The Adjutant General (TAG).
3. Establishment of a new system of casualty reporting that gave more information to TAG in the initial report with greater accuracy and more speed in transmission.
4. Establishment of a new Table of Organization and Equipment, 12-500, dated 15 November 1952, that provided

more trained personnel for casualty reporting when a unit went into combat.

Considerable public and official interest was generated in the procurement methods of the Army to support operations in Korea and related foreign aid programs. Repeated criticism of Army procurement practices and conduct of Army procurement personnel by Congress and the press prompted the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff to assign TIG the additional responsibility of inspecting contract administration.

In January 1952, The Inspector General was authorized to establish ten field offices under his direct supervision, comprising 127 officers and 47 civilians for the sole purpose of conducting inspections of the administration of Army contracts. The personnel manning these field offices attended a three-week special school presented by DAIG before assuming their duties.

Further analysis of the quality of inspectors' general performance led the Chief of Staff to direct that all detailed IGs attend a course of instruction before going to their assignments. The first class began in January 1953.

IG functions in the combat zone were much like those of World War II. Inspections and investigations dealt with the same sort of topics as encountered before; however, racial issues became more prominent. General inspections continued to be conducted on combat service support units while issue specific inspections (e.g., servicability of weapons, accountability of individual load bearing equipment (LBE)) were held for combat units as they came off the line for reconstitution.

As the front in Korea stabilized, IGs were often used for non-functional tasks such as serving on awards boards and reviewing reports; however, this was discontinued once commanders realized that such

duties were affecting the impartiality and objectivity of the IG.

VIETNAM (1965 - 1973)

The American Army that took to the field in Vietnam had an IG system with duties and procedures very similar to those of today. Some CONUS IGs developed inspection programs for units deploying to Vietnam; however, this was not a DAIG directed program as it once had been in World Wars I and II.

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The US Army, Vietnam (USARV), IG office was authorized officers and 20 enlisted personnel. They worked complaints, assistance, investigations, and general inspections. In 1968, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Westmoreland, directed that annual general inspections (AGIs) would be given Army-wide (to include units in Vietnam). The USARV IG conducted 130 unit AGIs from 1968 to 1971. USARV inspected all types of units in Vietnam but concentrated on those organizations which did not have detailed IGs assigned in their direct chain of command.

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USARV regulations authorized those commanders with a detailed IG on their staff to appoint acting IGs for any subordinate unit, battalion-sized or higher. The 1st Cavalry Division in 1969 had acting IGs in each battalion because of its wide dispersion over large areas. The 25th Infantry Division, on the other hand, operated with only its detailed IG because it was much more concentrated.

Investigation and complaint issues were similar to those encountered in earlier wars. It was noted that the number of complaints dropped as combat intensity increased. DAIG policy was for complaints to be directed to the lowest level where a detailed or acting IG was assigned.

At the joint level, the IG, Military Assistance Command -Vietnam (MACV) had four officers and four enlisted members in 1967. This grew to 115 U.S. officers and enlisted and 15 Vietnamese interpreters before the war's end. This increased manning was a direct result of the IG's value to the command in uncovering and solving problems while they were still small. For example, in one year alone, the IG, MACV did 300 investigations and handled 20,000 IGARs.

This importance of the IG system to the Vietnam War effort was demonstrated by the fact that the joint, annual campaign plan routinely included an IG annex: Annex S. This annex laid out the scope and authority given the IG by the commander.

DESERT SHIELD/STORM (Aug 1990 - Apr 1991)

The IG experience in Desert Shield/Storm was initially similar to the Spanish American War in one aspect. The war was brief and surprisingly successful in a large part because combat, combat support, and combat service support units entered the conflict proficient with their equipment and trained in the latest Airland Battle doctrine. However, many inspectors general entered the war with procedures, plans, manning and equipment tables based on almost 20 years of meeting requirements in a peacetime setting.

Naturally enough, for some inspectors general, the rapid transition out of the grooves of the peacetime routine was difficult. But unlike IGs in the Spanish American War, Desert Shield/Storm IGs adapted rapidly and positively to the changing situation.

As for command use of the IG during the war, the IG, 416th Engineer Command, after-action report says it best for the majority of cases:

"The IG personnel in our command were not used for any other function than official IG business."

CONU8...Unit IGs were initially involved in deployment activities ranging from ensuring units were doing the CG's mandatory pre-deployment training to monitoring convoy, rail-loading, and port of embarkation operations. As units physically left CONUS, the average IG shop initially divided into two elements: one element remained at the unit's home station and the other accompanied the deploying force to Southwest Asia (SWA). In many cases, the deployed IG element had to further subdivide its people once in theater in order to serve the spread out command.

The home station element had the mission of maintaining a full service IG shop for the non-deploying soldiers and dependents. In almost all cases, this population far exceeded the number of troops deployed. Inspectors general at installation level and below spent the majority of their time on mobilization, reserve component and dependent support issues while DAIG focused on doing mobilization assessments with the objective of providing the Army leadership feedback on the process.

OCONU8...Many IGs were in the "first string" sent to SWA as, for example, was the IG of the 3rd Armored Division. The first major obstacle to IG mission accomplishment was a lack of organic equipment. Some inspectors general that did arrive with assigned vehicles and adequate tentage, cots, light sets, and field desks did so, in most cases, only because they were lucky enough to be able to hand receipt such items from deactivating divisions (e.g., 8th Infantry Division). Later, some IG offices were issued leased vehicles through host nation support agreements.

Lack of communications was another major obstacle for IGs. The majority of IGs had improper communication equipment

for the situation or no equipment at all. The Inspector General Worldwide Network (IGNET), the IG community's primary means of automated communications, did not do well in SWA because it was neither designed as a deployable system nor for the rigors of combat. The situation improved when IGs received capability to link their E-mail into the Defense Data Network (DDN) via Terminal Access Control (TAC) points but for a considerable amount of time IGs had to rely on couriers and telephones.

Many inspectors general in SWA found that assistance became their first priority, followed by inspecting. Inspections were typically intense, short duration looks with rapid feedback provided to the unit leadership. Inspectors general did inspection of units to include safety and security, casualty evacuation plans, EPW plans, and unit combat sleep plans while waiting for the ground war to begin. The IG also became a creditable means to check into and put to rest rumors.

Inspectors general did not get the opportunity to do much during the ground war because of its short duration (100 hours); however, IGs were prepared to assess the handling of displaced civilians, reconstitution operations, personnel replacement, graves registration and civil military operations, to name a few.

As did happen at the end of past wars, inspectors general work increased significantly with the cease-fire. They became involved with unit reconstitution, property accountability, awards and war trophy accountability, and security. Major Desert Shield/Storm IG issues and associated tasks in addition to those already discussed were:

- * Awards.
- * Conscientious objectors.
- * Deployability of P3 profiles.
- * Reserve component issues.
- * Pay (entitlements for RC).
- * Abuse of command authority.
- * Theater living conditions.
- * Involuntary service beyond ETS/retirement.
- * TDA augmentation (full mobilization not declared).
- * Personnel policies (married/dual-service soldiers, enlisted promotions).
- * Mail.
- * NBC (optical inserts for protective masks).

THE FUTURE WARTIME IG

"The Future Ain't What Is Used to Be."
Yogi Berra

No one can accurately predict where the Army will fight next. We do anticipate a future environment with circumstances significantly different from the past as shown by the below chart.

THEN
Bipolar
Unified Threat
Containment
Europe-Soviet
5 Corps/28 Divisions
Forward Deployed
Structured Forces
Nuclear
Attrition

NOW
Multipolar
Vague Threat
Crisis Response
Regional-Crisis
4 Corps/20 Divisions
Power Projection
Tailored Forces
Conventional
Decisive Victory

The U.S. Army of the future will probably be smaller, CONUS based, modern, and with a substantial mix of active and reserve component forces. To ensure this future Army is ready and that there will be no more "Task Force Smiths" as we had in Korea in 1950, our Army leadership is committed to a strategy based on:

- * A credible force for deterrence.
- * A rapid response to crises.
- * A forward presence (vice "deployed").
- * A rapid reconstitution of forces to expand and sustain the fight.

Because of these factors, inspectors general can expect the rapid deployment

of Army units on short notice against opponents with ground forces that may outnumber the deploying US forces. Operational security (OPSEC) will limit what families can know about the situation. There will probably be no accurate prediction of when the troops will return and when Reserve Component forces will reinforce, augment and/or regenerate the deployed units.

IGs can expect these situations to generate many questions, requests for assistance, allegations and complaints. Inspections will be a major duty with IGs involved in looking at high-priority issues which are of importance to the commander and the command.

The deploying inspector general can expect to operate a combat environment in which friendly units are dispersed, changes in task organization are frequent, and host nation support and rapid contracting are major sources of combat service support.

The future wartime inspector general is very likely to be involved in the following issues/areas and related tasks:

- * Artificial intelligence.
- * Casualties.
- * CAPSTONE alignment.
- * Combat efficiency.
- * Communications.
- * Fraud, waste & abuse.
- * Friendly fire accidents.
- * Information management.
- * NBC.

* Partial mobilization.

* POWs/EPWs.

* Personnel actions.

* Procurement/contracting.

* Robotics.

* Round-out units.

* Safety.

Past advice is still valid for IGs wanting to successfully support the commander in future wartime scenarios:

* Do tasks that are relevant to the command/commander.

* Stay flexible.

* Be proactive.

* Be thorough.

* Mix compliance with systemic procedures.

* Hand-off and follow-up.

* Don't allow yourself to be rushed and produce poor work.

* Collect facts - determine the real causes and don't provide guesses; don't shoot from the hip.

* Resolve issues at the lowest possible level.

MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LIST (METL)

What should an IG do when his unit is alerted, mobilized, deployed and engaged in a combat environment? The answer is simple: do the essential things first. But determining what are the mission essential tasks for the IG in a given scenario will vary depending on many factors. For example, a CONUS-based division IG's initial areas of interest may be with deployment issues, while a forward deployed division IG is concerned with the issues associated with a no-notice, go-to-war scenario.

For this reason, IGs need to develop METLs as do all members of the battle staff. Field Manual 25-100, Training the Force, and FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training, explain the METL development process.

WHAT IS A METL?

A METL is a compilation of collective mission essential tasks which must be successfully performed if an organization is to accomplish its wartime mission (FM 25-100).

KEY POINTS

Whenever possible, the IG effort during an alert, assembly, moveout and actual combat should have a "battle focus." Battle focus drives the IG METL development process. It is the concept whereby the IG uses his commander's wartime mission to derive in peacetime the primary tasks the IG should do in wartime. These tasks become the focal point for IG planning and are articulated in the IG's METL. In addition, the METL -

* Must be understood by all key IG personnel so they can integrate their efforts and resources.

* Must apply to the entire IG shop.

* May vary for like units because of different wartime missions and locations.

* Must be briefed to and approved by the IG's commander.

Resource availability does not affect METL development. The METL is an unconstrained statement of tasks required

to accomplish the wartime mission. Inspectors general must recognize the peacetime limitations faced by subordinates in his office and tailor wartime missions within these practical constraints. If the IG determines he cannot execute all the tasks on his METL to standard, he must make this known to his commander. The commander then has the responsibility to determine what tasks the IG will prepare for, execute, and adjust the METL as necessary. In any case, the IG and his commander must ensure the mission and METL are consistent.

The METL is not prioritized. It may be changed or adjusted if the wartime mission changes. Inspectors general should reexamine their IG shop METL periodically to ensure it still supports the wartime mission. This is especially true for newly assigned IGs, or those IGs with units that have new or modified wartime missions. The IG should develop or adjust the IG METL to ensure that it supports and complements the unit's mission. FM 25-101 describes how to make METL revisions.

Inspectors general of tables of distribution and allowance (TDA) units must also develop a battle-focused METL that enables them to support the needs of their assigned unit. The METL development process is the same as for TO&E units. These tasks can range from wartime mobilization to support for disasters or local emergencies.

SOURCES

Inspectors general determine their METLs based on their unit war plans and external directives. War plans consist of the unit's anticipated wartime missions, operations plans and contingency plans. External directives include -

- * Authorization documents (e.g., TO&E).
- * CAPSTONE mission guidance letters.

* Doctrinal manuals (e.g., FM 33-1, Psychological Opns).

* Force integration plans.

* Installation wartime transition and deployment plans.

* Mobilization plans.

APPROVAL OF THE IG SHOP METL

After the IG develops the IG shop METL, he briefs his commander. The commander approves the IG shop METL.

BATTLE TASKS

After the commander approves the IG METL, the IG in charge approves those tasks which his subordinates must accomplish if the IG mission is to be performed: those that are critical to the success of the IG METL. For example, in the assistance -investigation (A&I) section, some battle tasks might be:

1. Provide assistance to soldiers.
2. Conduct inquiries and investigations as required.

These become the IG battle tanks. The selection of these battle tasks allows the senior IG to focus on those tasks he wants to emphasize during internal shop planning, training and evaluation. It also enables him to allocate scarce resources such as time, TDY funds, and typing support.

SUMMARY

The METL is based on the wartime mission and provides the foundation for the IG training and readiness plan. Inspectors general develop METLs because the IG shop cannot maintain/obtain proficiency on every possible task. The METL development process allows the IG to narrow training, preparation and support actions to an achievable number: it provides focus. The IG office must train as it plans to operate

during wartime. This is the same for

active and reserve components.

CONCLUSIONS

The inspector general has always been a prominent wartime staff officer and though IG duties and roles might have changed in various conflict, IGs have always been an extension of their commander" to check and instill discipline, ethics and standards in the force.

The role of the IG in wartime, as in peacetime, is defined largely by the individual commander. That is why it is important for the commander to understand that though IG focus, pace of operations and methodology may change, the basic IG functions to inspect, assist, investigate, teach and train continue during wartime. The commander loses more than he gains when he uses his IG" in a manner not intended by AR 20-1.

Army Regulation (AR) 20-1 gives the commander guidance on how to prevent conflicts of interests and maintain impartiality in his IGs.

"IGs will not establish command policy except as provided in AR 1-201" (see Para. 1-12 c., AR 20-1). "Detailed IGs...will not...be assigned duties that may subsequently disqualify them from making or assisting in impartial inquiries or investigations into any function or activity within the command to which they are assigned. Examples include SDO, LOD investigator,..." (see para. 2-7.a. (c)).

When a commander diverts his IG to other duties (e.g., rear detachment commander), it may be because the commander does not clearly understand how the IG can be a relevant, proactive and responsive asset to the command in wartime. You, as an IG, have the task to ensure your commander understands this fact. Otherwise, you too are subscribing to the view that the IG system is only a peacetime phenomenon.

APPENDIX A WARTIME IG TIPS/LESSON LEARNED

The IG assistance capability is a significant positive motivator to the soldier. Thus, it is especially important for IGs to maintain an IGAR processing function throughout all phases of war. This may be especially difficult because of frequent cross attachment of units and personnel and difficulty of locating and communicating with units in the area of operations.

Inspections of units/operations will be unannounced, done by small inspection teams and without elaborate outbriefs or formal reports. The assessment focus will be more on identifying the problem areas, bringing them to the attention of the commander and getting them fixed as

quickly as possible rather than identifying the "guilty parties."

Loss of expertise through casualties, influx of new units, commanders unfamiliar with the operations and inadequately staffed installations and organizations will all tax a commander's warfighting capability. Historically, many commanders have used the IG training function to substitute for experience. The technical training capability of the inspector general can be expected to be called upon again as the war increases in time and intensity.

You will have problems maintaining contact and access with your boss and

subordinate units. But remember, your information flow from units and to the commander with regard to assessment results, assistance trends and the status of investigations is as important in war as in peacetime.

Your boss in many cases and especially during combat, will often be located in the tactical command post (TAC CP) while your operation is probably based at the main or rear CP, or both. During Desert Storm, the XVIII Abn Corps TAC CP was two hours by helicopter, eight hours by vehicle from the Corps main CP.

You might have to work hard to be included in planning and kept up to date on the situation. Inspectors general are not a member of the coordinating or special staff and thus have traditionally been outside the normal planning process.

Getting equipment and fining may be a struggle if your MTOE or TDA does not reflect your true personnel and equipment authorization requirements. What you deploy with may well be all you will have for assets for some time to come. Many units of all types will be requesting personnel and equipment especially if the force is deploying to an undeveloped theater of operations with little or no host nation infrastructure.

Not having all the equipment and personnel you need is a fact of life in the Army for many organizations. Just ensure your shortages are the results of conscious decisions by knowledgeable policymakers. Anticipate your needs and submit necessary MTOE changes, if required, to be ready when the need arises.

If previous history is any indicator, you should not expect a slowdown in IG business once the war is over. The nature, techniques and IG procedures will continue as before but, again, the focus will change. Issues will now be those involving redeployment, transfer and disposition of equipment, ammunition turn-in, safety considerations, site turnovers and personnel separation. -

Remember these tips when getting your IG office ready for war

- * Identify the RC units which will be assigned to your unit; make contact with their IG.
- * Be familiar with those sister component regulations (USAR, ARNG) applicable to the issues you may be handling (e.g., pay).
- * Be familiar with sister component trends/types of assistance cases.
- * Establish a solid understanding with your commander on when the commander wants the IG in theater and what he expects the IG to do once there. Ensure he knows your recommendations for use of the IG and also that your understanding of your wartime role matches his.
- * Use judgement and common sense when inspecting units in combat so as not to use too much of the unit's time when soldiers are resting, maintaining equipment, training or preparing to continue combat operations.
- * Focus on what is important to mission accomplishment when doing inspections. Commanders rarely "want to pick up peanuts when the elephants are stampeding all around them."
- * Always try to be part of the solution, not part of the problem. Try to help units fix problems where they exist.
- * Suggest the appointment of Acting IGs when units are widely dispersed.
- * Do not forget division rear (DREAR) operations and the units deployed there.
- * Maintain liaison with your home station IG shop.
- * Deploy on FTXs. Demonstrate to commanders that you have a worthwhile mission on deployments.

- * Forward deployed IGs should stay abreast of the unit task organization.
- * Trainup the stay-behind IG in the CONUS mobilization process and mobilization responsibilities for IGs.
- * Home based IGs should try their utmost to solve mobilizing soldier problems at the mobilization station because the forward deployed IG may not have the resources (e.g., time) to do the fixing.
- * Ensure all IG shop personnel are deployable (e.g., POM qualified; personnel affairs in order, weapons qualification).
- * Have an IG shop load plan (office items, ARs); practice it.
- * Practice IG shop alerts, outload and deployment.
- * Establish an SOP with your rear/homebase detachments (e.g., times to communicate, who initiates calls)
- * Check RC family care plans, POM (wills, POV storage, disposition of HHGs) of those RC units assigned to your unit.
- * Consider task organizing IG teams to unit MSCs.
- * Prepare SOPs for the hand-off of all active IG files to next higher or RC IG personnel (JAW mobilization plans).
- * Check IG personnel against the unit battle roster.
- * Keep in mind - Nothing simulates war!

The following are suggested areas of wartime emphasis by phases for IGs based on lessons learned -

DEPLOYMENT

- * Aerial and seaport operations (both embarkation and debarkation).

- * Assistance for soldier/dependent complaints.
- * CG mandatory pre-deployment training.
- * Check airheads/seaports for lost or abandoned vehicles.
- * Convoy operations.
- * Equipment readiness.
- * Family assistance center/family support group activities.
- * Rail-loading operations.
- * Rumor control.

PRE-COMBAT

- * Carry to commanders the CG's intent and guidance.
- * Informing newly assigned/attached units how to contact the IG.
- * Morale.
- * Plans/Systems.

o Ammunition upload.

O Battle assessment & repair (BDAR).

O Casualty evacuation (e.g., disposition/handling of

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personal effects). o Casualty notification. O Civil military operations (CMO). O Combat sleep schedules. Combat standing operating procedures (CSOP). Handling of civilian detainees, EPW and refugees. Graves registration. o Maintenance of weapons and equipment. O Personnel replacement. O Reconstitution. O Safety.

* Quick-look assessment of units to include safety & security.

* Rumor control.

COMBAT

* Displaced Civilians.

* Handling of captured weapons/unexploded ordnance.

* Investigate non-battle injuries.

* Operations o BOAR. o Casualty evacuation. O Civilian detainees. O CMO. O EPWs. O Graves registration. O Main support battalion maintenance. O Personnel replacement. O Refugee control. O Resupply Operations.

* Safety

POST COMBAT

* Awards.

* Claims.

* Facilitate after action (AAR) process.

* Family/personal reentry problems.

* Household goods/POVs.

* Morale.

* Personnel actions (e.g., reenlistment, schools)

* Ports of debarkation operations.

* Property accountability.

* Reconstitution.

* Reports of survey.

APPENDIX B EXAMPLE IG METLs

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (OTIG) AND USAIGA MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LIST (DA)

- * Develop and publish policy and doctrine for the inspector general system.
- * Serve as the Inspector General for the Secretariat; Army Staff; and National Capitol Region field operating agencies when the FOA does not have detailed IG.
- * Select quality personnel to be inspectors general.
- * Train detailed, assistant, acting inspectors general and administrative support personnel.
- * Provide assistance to commanders, service and family members, DA civilians and retirees.
- * Conduct inspections.
- * Conduct investigations and inquiries.
- * Conduct intelligence oversight.
- * Conduct followup.
- * Serve as the Secretariat focal point to infract with external audit and inspection agencies (GAO and IG, DOD) and USAAA.
- * Maintain the integrity of the IG system.
- * Teach Army policy, procedures, and systems to improve operations and efficiency.
- * Perform coordinating staff functions.
- * Disseminate news, innovative ideas, and lessons learned.

EXAMPLE MACOM LEVEL IG MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LIST

1. Perform the role of the Commander's unbiased consultant by evaluating management leadership procedures and practices.
2. Improve the Army while protecting the rights of individuals, through timely, complete and impartial inquiries, investigations, and inspections.
3. Conduct investigations and inquiries to determine the state of readiness, economy, efficiency, discipline, and morale of all MACOM level and subordinate units.
4. Schedule and conduct nuclear surety program inspections.
5. Provide reports and assessments on matters relating to command, control and support of assigned forces and joint operational readiness.
6. Assure the effectiveness of the IG system in peacetime, transition to war, and wartime.

EXAMPLE HQs, ARMY LEVEL IG

MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LIST

- * Ensure Inspector General Staff is organized and expanded according to the Army mobilization TDA with regard to staffing and increased mission

HOW : 1. Submit proper requisitions for the personnel plus-up via Mob-TDA.

2. Have a developed Organizational Inspection Program (OIP) which ensures early detection and corrective actions for areas not meeting established standards.

3. Conduct inspections according to OIP to ensure units are manned, trained and equipped for deployment and commitment.

4. Evaluate mobilization station(s) and command(s) valid-ation for deployment IAW the basic plan.

5. Visit and coordinate with appropriate subordinate activities in support of the Army mobilization (mob stations, mobilization assistance teams, MUSARCs, STARCs, JSACs) and be prepared to provide written reports.

6. Be prepared to direct or redirect internal IG personnel assets toward priority issues as changes develop.

* Provide the Commanding General a continuing assessment of the operational, administrative, and logistical effectiveness of the command, state of the economy, efficiency, discipline, and morale during the transition from peacetime to wartime operations.

HOW : 1. Maintain communication with any/all subordinate command Inspectors General for assistance and investigative oversight and conduct sensing sessions throughout subordinate comands.

Be prepared to conduct special inspections on a short-notice basis if and when systemic problems arise.

3. Conduct visits to mobilization stations during mobilization to ensure successful unit preparations and operations into the post-mob and point of embarkation phases progress satisfactorily.

EXAMPLE CORPS LEVEL IG MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LIST

Deploy the Corps

Execute recall of personnel.

Prepare equipment and personnel for deployment.

Split IG office - MTOE/TDA.

Assess adequacy of transportation and facilities available to units.

Inspect POE for efficient operations.

Assist the validation assessment of deploying units.

Conduct battle staff assessment of the Corps staff/Corps MSCs; inspect units to ensure units are manned, trained and equipped for deployment.

Assess the Corps C3 and provide feedback to the Corps CG, DCG.

Conduct investigations and inquiries.

Conduct compliance or systemic special inspection.

Maintain full assistance support.

Plan Combat Operations

Assess unit and headquarters C3.

Conduct battle staff assessments.

Review plans for adequacy.

Assess morale, welfare, readiness, discipline, and sufficiency of unit pre-combat preparations. -

Monitor trends. -

Provide an objective check on commanders and technical expert assessment of unit readiness and capabilities.

Provide full assistance support.

Conduct Combat Operations

Conduct Investigations, inquiries or special investigations as directed by the CG.

Sustain the Corps

Assess the adequacy of soldier and unit support in the areas of mess, mail, medical, laundry, pay, personnel administration, quality of training and leadership.

Assess the state of combat readiness within committed/reserve/reconstituted forces.

Emphasize "teaching" to leaders while reestablishing discipline and maintenance standards.

Monitor trends.

Conduct investigations and inquiries.

Conduct compliance or systemic special inspections.

Maintain full assistance support.

EXAMPLE INFANTRY DIVISION INSPECTOR GENERAL MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LIST

Premobilization

- o Provide the Division Commander with a continuous assessment of operational efficiency and effectiveness within the command through normal Inspector General (IG) assistance, inspections and investigations.

- o Monitor, assess and report on the state of morale, discipline, economy and readiness throughout the Division.

- o Instruct and advise all units in systems and techniques to improve efficiency and effectiveness and to avoid fraud, waste and abuse of resources.

Transition to War

- o Continue all premobilization missions.

- o Monitor, assess and report on Division deployment activities as directed by the Division Commander.

Wartime Operations

- o Sustain all premobilization missions.

- o Monitor, assess and report on offensive, defensive and non-combat evacuation operations as directed by the Division Commander.

Transition to Peace

- o Continue to monitor all premobilization missions.

- o Monitor, assess and report on Division redeployment activities as directed by the Division Commander.

EXAMPLE CONUS INSTALLATION LEVEL INSPECTOR GENERAL MOBILIZATION MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LIST

Expand the Garrison Execute recall of personnel. Split IG office - MTOE/TDA Integrate IMSs and new personnel. Train new personnel. Conduct investigations and inquiries. Conduct compliance or systemic special instructions. Expand full assistance support.

Prepare units for Deployment

Assess adequacy of transportation and facilities available to units.

Inspect POE for efficient operations.

Assess the validation process.

Assess efficiency of equipment C3 by type and personnel by MOS cross-leveling.

Assess unit and headquarters C3 structure for conduct of wartime activities.

Review plans for adequacy and commander's intent.

Assess morale, welfare, readiness, discipline, and sufficiency of unit preparations for deployment.

Monitor trends.

Conduct investigations, inquiries, or special inspections as directed by CG.

Provide full assistance support.

Sustain the Garrison

Assess the adequacy of soldier and unit support in the areas of mess, mail, medical, laundry, pay, personnel administration, quality of training and leadership.

Emphasize "teaching" to leaders while establishing discipline and standards.

Monitor trends.

Conduct investigations and inquiries.

Conduct compliance or systemic special inspections.

Maintain full assistance support.

STUDENT OUTLINE
WARTIME IG

PURPOSE

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

METL/WAR PLANS

CONCLUSIONS